ABSTRACT In this paper, a decoding method of joint zero-forcing and successive interference cancellation (ZF-SIC) is put forward to assist the study of the individual secrecy in the quasi-static Rayleigh fading single-input multiple-output multiple access wiretap channel. We first evaluate the individual secrecy performance by deriving the closed-form expressions in terms of positive secrecy capacity probability, secrecy outage probability, and effective secrecy throughput (EST). Besides the expected impact of the SIC order, we find, in high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime, the secrecy performance is only determined by the transmitter's relative distance to eavesdropper over legitimate receiver rather than the SNR. Such a result prompts us to propose an SIC order scheduling scheme (alternative scheme) on basis of the transmitters' relative distances from the shortest to the longest. It is proved optimal in achieving total maximum EST in high SNR regime. Finally, we also investigate the problem of optimal power allocation to each transmitter under the constraint of the limited total power. An interesting solution to this problem is disclosed with the aid of numerical analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing demands for mobility and ubiquitous connectivity, wireless communications have been playing an increasingly important role in our daily lives. Meanwhile, the broadcast nature of wireless communications makes the security and privacy issues full of challenges. Many techniques have been studied to overcome these issues. One of them is the physical layer security, which was first introduced by Wyner in his seminal work [1] . In that pioneering work, Wyner characterized the rate-equivocation region for the degraded wiretap channel, which was extended to more general non-degraded and Gaussian wiretap channel in [2] and [3] , respectively. The secrecy capacity usually is the main metric of secrecy performance in the Gaussian scenario, where a non-zero secrecy rate can be achieved as long as the main channel is more favorable than the eavesdropper channel [3] . However, in the fading scenarios, more favorable main channel is not always guaranteed, which brings in another two secrecy performance metrics, secrecy outage probability and ergodic secrecy capacity [4] , [5] . They show a positive secrecy rate is available even when the eavesdropper channel is more favorable on the average.
The secrecy transmissions for the multi-user scenario were also intensively studied. In a massive amount of work, the multi-user wiretap channel is usually modeled from the downlink. [6] - [9] characterize the problems without considering the existence of user interference to both the eavesdropper and the desired user. In [10] , the downlink multi-user secrecy transmissions were implemented by a multi-beam directional modulation, where beamforming vector of the confidential message is designed to preserve its power as possible in the desired directions while the projection matrix of artificial noise is to minimize the effect on the desired directions. [11] introduced an original symbol phase rotated (OSPR) secure transmission scheme to defend against eavesdroppers employed with massive antennas for the downlink multi-user secrecy transmissions. The same scheme was applied for the uplink case in [12] . Another important work about multi-user wiretap channel from the perspective of uplink was introduced in [13] . However, the authors just characterized how to schedule the users to achieve optimal multi-user diversity gain. The user interference is avoided deliberately in the designed model. Similar study was done in [14] , by expanding to the multi-cell scenario. In contrast, [15] took the user interference into account, yet the study mainly focused on the achievable ergodic secrecy sumrates rather than the secrecy performance of a single user.
Recently, a new paradigm of the multi-user wiretap channel is known as multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT), where multiple access (MAC) along with one eavesdropper is modeled to achieve secrecy transmissions. Here, the user interference to both the transmitters and the eavesdropper is taken into account. The Gaussian MAC-WT was first introduced by Ender Tekin et al. [16] . the authors identified the achievable secrecy rate regions by using codebooks generated randomly according to a Gaussian distribution, namely Gaussian signaling, for the degraded Gaussian MAC-WT. Later, the general case of Gaussian MAC-WT was extended in [17] , and the Gaussian signaling is still used to achieve the secrecy rate regions. However, the secure degree of freedom (DoF) of these Gaussian signaling based achievable schemes mentioned above is zero, which motivates researchers for further work on the secure DoF of the MAC-WT [18] , [19] . In [20] , the secrecy rate is achievable with polar coding scheme via rate-splitting and different cooperative jamming strategies.
The fading MAC-WT was first addressed by Tekin and Yener [21] , where they still utilize the Gaussian signaling together with cooperative jamming based schemes to provide the achievable ergodic secrecy rate regions just as in [17] . As expected, no secure DoF is available. [22] proposed a new achievable scheme to achieve secure DoF for the two users. [23] investigated the problem of maximizing the average secrecy sum rate with linear precoders in the fading cognitive multiple access wiretap channel, where the interference threshold is constrained at the multiple primary user receivers.
It is worth mentioning there are still many other literatures about the MAC-WT. Nevertheless, in all these works, the studies mainly focused on the signaling schemes to achieve the secrecy rate regions. That is, they only characterized the secrecy performance of the MAC-WT as a whole from information theoretic perspective without considering the specific decoding methods at the legitimate receiver.
In this work, we intend to address the MAC-WT from the perspective of the secrecy performance of an individual transmitter. The MAC-WT we consider is composed of one N -antenna desired receiver, one M -antenna eavesdropper and K single-antenna transmitters. We call it K -transmitter single-input multiple-output (SIMO) MAC-WT. Jiang et al. [24] have already investigated the individual performance of the K -user SIMO MAC-WT, where eavesdropper is assumed to be armed with single antenna. In this paper, we extend the single antenna to the multiple antennas for the eavesdropper, and re-derive the closedform expressions of the secrecy performance. Moreover, we propose two schemes about how to schedule the SIC order for the legitimate receiver, and also study the problem of optimal power allocation to the transmitters, subject to the limited total power. The system model and channel conditions are similar to the assumption in [24] . The secrecy performance is also measured in terms of the positive secrecy capacity probability, secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput. Differently, we only specialize the decoding method to the joint zero-forcing and SIC (ZF-SIC) at the legitimate receiver in this work.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows
• Formulate the secrecy capacity of a single transmitter on basis of ZF-SIC decoding, and derive the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability density function (pdf) of signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs).
• Characterize the individual secrecy performance in terms of positive secrecy capacity probability, secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput (EST); Evaluate the impacts of the SIC order, signalto-noise ratio (SNR) and the number of antennas.
• Investigate the asymptotic behaviors of the individual secrecy performance, revealing the secrecy performance is only location-dependent in high SNR regime.
• Propose two SIC order scheduling scheme, round-robin scheme and alternative scheme, and prove the alternative scheme is optimal in achieving sum of maximum ESTs in high SNR regime.
• Study the problem of optimal power allocation under the constraint of the limited total power, and present an interesting solution to the problem. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we model the network and form the problem. The secrecy performance as well as the asymptotic behavior is investigated in Section III. Section IV comes up with two SIC order scheduling schemes. The problem of optimal power allocation is studied in Section V. Section VI aims to further examine the problem numerically. Finally, we draw the conclusion in Section VII.
Notation: Vectors and matrix are symbolized by a bold font and I m denotes the m × m identity matrix. || · || is Euclidean norm of a vector, and (·) H is Hermitian transpose operator. Sets are denoted by a script font. A\B denotes set A minus set B, ∅ indicates empty set, and | · | indicates the cardinality of set. CN and χ 2 m specify circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution and the chi-squared distribution with m degrees of freedom, respectively. The logarithm function log is base 2, and [·] + = max(·, 0).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider one type of MAC-WT, as depicted in Fig. 1 the data from one of the user (U k ) through another quasi-static Rayleigh fading link. Here, N ≥ K and M ≥ 1 are assumed. For all k ∈ K {1, . . . , K }, we have the following notation descriptions:
• x k is the desired signal sent from U k , the transmit power of which is denoted by P k .
• h k and g k are the main and eavesdropper's channel gain vectors for U k , and suppose
• n and w are the additive zero-mean complex Gaussian noise vectors at BS and Eve, respectively. The corresponding covariance matrices are denoted as N b I N and N e I M , i.e., n ∼ CN (0, N b I N ) and w ∼ CN (0, N e I M ).
• λ k and µ k are defined as
Therefore, the instantaneous composite signals received at BS and Eve can be formulated as
A. INDIVIDUAL SECRECY CAPACITY According to [4] , in the quasi-static fading channels, the achievable instantaneous secrecy capacity is the difference between the instantaneous capacity of main and eavesdropper's channel. As such, we formulate the instantaneous secrecy capacity of an individual user, e.g., U k , as
where
and C e,k = log(1 + η k ) are the corresponding instantaneous capacities of the main and eavesdropper's channel for U k . The superscript indicates the dependence of the order of SIC decoding.
1) MAIN CAPACITY
We first re-write the expression in (1) by additionally considering the employment of the SIC decoding at the BS.
In general, the aggregate signal left before decoding U k at the BS can be expressed as,
where ⊆ K\ {k}, indicating U k is decoded just before user(s) in the set (index) during the SIC process. When = K\ {k}, (4) is equivalent to (1), specifying U k is decoded at first. = ∅ means no interference term in (4) , showing U k is decoded at final.
Obviously, the SINR of U k at the BS (i.e., γ ( ) k ) not only depends on the SIC order, but also depends on the decoding method, which are specialized to ZF in this work.
The main idea of ZF-SIC decoding is to remove the interference term i∈ h i x i in (4) k . Due to the independence of vectors h j (∀j ∈ K), the space spanned by the vectors h i (∀i ∈ ) is supposed to be full rank, hence, the dimension d
. Consequently, the main capacity can be formulated as
2) WIRETAP CAPACITY
As for wiretap capacity of U k , we directly characterize it with its upper bound expression for simplicity such that all users' interference is eliminated. Consequently, we obtain,
where the received SINR
is obtained with MRC at Eve.
B. STATISTICS OF SINRs
We note the statistic of γ ( ) k is dependent on the cardinality of rather than the specific user(s) in the set. For the notation convenience, we rewrite γ
k . Here, the superscript n denotes the cardinality of , indicating the number of interferers.
The closed-form expression of CDF of γ (n) k can be obtained according to [26] ,
Similarly, as the fact that g k ∼ CN (0, σ 2 k I M ), it comes with
The closed-form expression of pdf for η k is given by,
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE
In this section, we investigate the individual secrecy performance, called secrecy performance for short hereinafter, in terms of positive secrecy capacity probability, secrecy outage probability, -outage secrecy capacity and effective secrecy throughput. The closed-form expressions are derived and related performance analysis is conducted as well.
A. POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY PROBABILITY
Let us start with the positive secrecy capacity probability. From the definition of the secrecy capacity in (3), the positive secrecy capacity probability is equivalent to the probability that the SINR at the BS is greater than that at Eve. It can be formulated as
We present the closed-form expression of the positive secrecy capacity probability in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The positive secrecy capacity probability of an individual user U k is given by
Proof: See Appendix A. Observing (10), one can find that P ps,k (n) is a decreasing function of n which ranges from 0 to K − 1. The cardinality n = K − 1 indicates U k is decoded at first, i.e., no user interference is eliminated, while n = 0 corresponds the best case of this user which is decoded at final. It also reveals U k only needs to concern its own order ''position'' in the SIC process without caring other users'. An increase in the number of antennas N also makes P ps,k (n) increase as well, showing that the spatial diversity gain is available for this secrecy performance metric.
Interestingly, we can further evaluate this secrecy performance metric from the perspective of locations. In the pathloss model, we notice that
, where d b,k is the distance between U k and BS, d e,k is the distance between U k and Eve, and α is the path-loss exponent. (10) then can be transformed into
We note the positive secrecy capacity probability of U k is only dependent on its relative distance to Eve over BS, besides its cardinality (i.e., n) and the number of antennas (i.e., N and M ). It has nothing to do with its power as well as other users', which makes it possible for BS to calculate the positive secrecy capacity probability for all legitimate users in its cell against the potential eavesdropper (who might be switched from the legitimate user such that the BS also knows its location) according to their locations.
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY AND -OUTAGE SECRECY CAPACITY
The secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability of secrecy capacity that is less than a predefined secrecy rate R s ,
where the superscript of the secrecy capacity is automatically changed into n, as it is only dependent on the cardinality of the set rather than the specific users in the set according to our previous analysis. Similarly, we state the closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability in the form of theorem.
Theorem 2: The secrecy outage probability of an individual user U k is given by
(13) Proof: See Appendix B. Apparently, P so,k (n, R s ) is an increasing function of n and/or R s . Also, the spatial diversity gain of the legitimate receiver exists, as the increment of N reduces P so,k (n, R s ). Oppositely, the secrecy performance worsens when the number of antennas at Eve (i.e., M ) increases.
The secrecy transmission probability is defined as the probability of secrecy capacity that is equal to or greater than a predefined secrecy rate, which is just the complement of secrecy outage probability. The expression is given by
It is, obviously, a decreasing function of n and/or R s . Here, a special case of the secrecy transmission probability can be concluded, P st,k (n, 0) = P ps,k (n).
Another performance metric which is always accompanied with the secrecy outage probability is -outage secrecy capacity. It is defined as the highest secrecy rate when the secrecy outage probability is not greater than , which can be defined as
Here, C
s,k ( ) specifies -outage secrecy capacity of U k . Although the complexity of (13) leads to no closed-form expression of the -outage secrecy capacity, it is possible to obtain the result via numerical root-finding. VOLUME 5, 2017
C. EFFECTIVE SECRECY THROUGHPUT
To further evaluate the average secrecy rate at which messages are transmitted to the legitimate receiver confidentially, we adopted another secrecy measure, called EST, which has been introduced in [27] . It is defined as the product of the secrecy rate R s and the corresponding secrecy transmission probability P st,k (n, R s ),
Obviously, T k (n, R s ) is a decreasing function of n, as P st,k (n, R s ) is. Differently, since P st,k (n, R s ) is an exponentially decaying function of R s , multiplying it with R s makes the product rise at first and then decline quickly with R s increasing, which indicates that there exists a maximum value for EST regarding R s .
We call the secrecy rate to achieve the maximum EST as the optimal secrecy rate, denoted by R * (n) s . Intuitively, the optimal secrecy rate varies with different values of n. R * (n) s with small value of n is greater than that with a big one, as P st,k (n, R s ) decays more slowly with small value of n.
The maximum EST is denoted as
Notably, the maximum EST is not limited to the function of n and R * (n) s . It will be transformed into other form of representation if necessary later.
More numerical detail for the EST will be examined later in Section VI.
D. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
We continue to analyze the asymptotic behaviors of the secrecy performance for extreme values of N and SNR.
Without loss of generality, we omit the subscript k for the expressions and notations in this subsection, and it will be omitted automatically if necessary later in this work.
We start from the asymptotic behaviors with the extreme value of N first. When N → ∞ for (7), F γ (n)(γ ) approaches to 0. Substituting it into the derivations in the Appendix A and B, we obtain,
Thus, the asymptotic expression of EST for infinite value of N is
where the optimal secrecy rate is limited to the related main capacity.
We move on to the asymptotic behaviors with the extreme value of SNR.
By setting the received average SNR at BS (on one diversity branch, denoted by SNR b ) as the benchmark, the received average SNR at Eve (one diversity branch) is specified as SNR e = βSNR b , i.e., λ/µ = β. Hereinafter, the ''SNR'' refers in particular to SNR b .
Assuming the ratio β is a non-zero value, with SNR approaching to ∞, λ and µ approach to 0. Consequently, we achieve the following asymptotic result for the infinite SNR from (13),
The asymptotic expression for the EST can be obtained accordingly,
where we also further make the expression from the perspective of locations by replacing 1/β with (d e /d b ) α . We note the secrecy performance is only determined by the relative distance to Eve over BS rather than SNR in a high SNR regime.
IV. SIC ORDER SCHEDULING
Since the significant impact of the SIC order on the secrecy performance, we intend to explore the SIC order scheduling strategies from the viewpoint of the BS. We first come up with the round-robin scheduling, and then propose an alternative scheduling scheme.
A. ROUND-ROBIN SCHEME
The round-robin SIC order scheduling scheme is an absolutely fair strategy for each user to share all these possible SIC orders. Any individual user takes turns to hold one certain SIC order ''position'' from the first to the last (correspondingly from n = K−1 to n = 0) for an equal time. Thus, the average maximum EST for an individual user U k can be given by
The total max-EST for this scheme is the sum of average maximum ESTs over all users.
To implement the round-robin scheduling, BS needs to access each corner point in the K-user capacity region with SIC for an equal time. Here, one corner point corresponds one possible SIC order among these K users. To achieve total max-EST, BS has to calculate all optimal secrecy rates for these K users at each corner point. There are exactly K ! possible corner points in this capacity region. Hence, the computational complexity is enormous, especially when the value of K is big enough.
B. ALTERNATIVE SCHEME
The alternative scheme is based on the users' the relative distance to Eve over BS (d e /d b ) in a certain time slot. To be concrete, the SIC order is sorted by Bob according to each user's the relative distance to Eve over BS from the shortest to the longest. That is, the user with shortest relative distance is decoded at first (n = K − 1), while the user with longest relative distance is decoded at last (n = 0).
Such a scheduling scheme significantly simplifies the computational complexity. Moreover, it is more practical to know the location of Eve than knowing its' CSI. Most importantly, in a high SNR regime, the alternative scheme can achieve the most total max-EST (sum of maximum ESTs of all users). We state it in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: In high SNR regime, the alternative scheme is the optimal SIC order scheduling scheme in achieving the sum of the maximum ESTs over all users.
Proof: First, let us divert to state the notation of the maximum EST in high SNR regime. We note, from (19) , the asymptotic expression for the EST is the function of n, R s and d e /d b (ignore N and M temporarily). Thus, the maximum asymptotic EST over R s is reduced to be the function of n and d e /d b . As such, we refer to it as T (a.s.)
).
Without loss of generality, we assume
. With the alternative scheme, the SIC order is U 1 → U 2 → . . . → U K (U 1 is decoded first, the corresponding cardinality (n) for U i is K − i, i ∈ K). We say this SIC order permutation (U 1 U 2 . . . U K ) is naturally ordered. As we know, any other permutations can be achieved via several steps of inversion from the naturally-ordered permutation. Taking a 5-permutation for instance, to achieve the permutation of U 3 U 2 U 5 U 1 U 4 , three steps of inversion is enough:
In the first step, the position exchange between U 4 and U 5 is an inversion. In the second step, the inversion takes place between U 3 and U 5 , while the exchange of U 1 and U 3 is an inversion in the last step. Thus, as long as we can prove that any step of order position inversion will reduce the total maximum EST, the proof is done.
Assume
, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K , and U i (n = q) is decoded before U j (n = p) in the current SIC order. As such, the cardinality for U i is greater than that for U j , i.e., q > p. Let us exchange the positions of these two users but keep the other users' positions. Obviously, an inversion happens. In the new SIC order permutation, the cardinality for U i is changed from q to p while the cardinality for U j is changed to q. Thus, the difference of total maximum EST between old and new SIC orders is T (a.s.) ) is not available, we can prove the problem via the property of this function. We note the slope of this function with respect to d e /d b increases with n decreasing, which means the gap of two curves with different n will enlarge with d e /d b increasing. One can view it more clearly from Fig. 4 , which is obtained via numerical root-finding. Therefore, we get T (a.s.)
). The proof is done.
Since the SIC order scheduled from the longest to the shortest relative distance has the most steps of inversion, it apparently achieves the least total max-EST. We present it with the following corollary.
Corollary 1: In high SNR regime, the worst SIC order scheduling scheme in achieving the sum of the maximum ESTs is reverting the alternative scheme, i.e., the user with the longest relative distance is decoded at first, while the user with the shortest relative distance is decoded at last.
V. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, we investigate the problem of optimal power allocation to the users in achieving the most total max-EST, subject to the limited total power P total . Before going on, we need to revise the representation of the notation.
Observing (13), we note the maximum EST in (20) can be expressed as the function of n, β k and P k . Thus, we change the expression in (20) with T max,k (n, β k , P k ), where
We adopt the alternative scheme for scheduling the SIC order for these users. Without loss of generality, we assume
Consequently, the problem can be formulated as follows,
It can be solved explicitly by Lagrangian methods. The Lagrange function is given by
where L is a Lagrange multiplier. Making partial derivatives and setting
We refer to the optimal power as [P * i (L)] + , which is subject to
We note the optimal power allocation point (P * 1 , P * 2 , . . . , P * K ) makes all of the derivatives identical to each other. The problem can be solved numerically. It can be seen more clearly in Section VI.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We continue to examine the previous analytic results numerically in this section. Suppose the default values for both N and M are 30 and 5, respectively. Here, ''SNR'' and β have the same definitions as in Subsection III-D. Fig. 2 shows the relationship between EST and R s for different values of SNR and n, where β = 1 is assumed. we can get the observations as follows:
A. IMPACTS OF SNR AND SIC ORDER
• For a given SNR and n, the EST curves rise first and go down later regarding R s .
• The EST is improved by high SNR.
• An decrease in n improves the EST, that is, the case of n = 0 achieves the most EST. The first item of the observation verifies the inference in Subsection III-C that each EST curve has a maximum value, i.e., T max (n, R * (n) s ). Meanwhile, we note the optimal secrecy rate (R * (n) s ) to achieve the maximum EST for each curve varies from SNR and n. The EST with low SNR will also obtain low optimal secrecy rate, while the less n achieves the higher R * (n) s . Although high SNR improves the EST, such an improvement has its limitation. Even SNR = 2 dB makes the EST very close to its asymptotic curve. Additionally, the EST difference for adjacent SIC order is not so significant, especially with high number of antennas in the legitimate receiver.
B. SPATIAL DIVERSITY
The Fig. 3 shows the impacts of the spatial diversity on the EST. We observe the EST increases dramatically with the increment of the number of the antennas at the BS, i.e., N , for all 4 different cases of SNR. Specifically, the maximum EST for n = 2 with N = 10, M = 5 in Fig. 3(c) is only 0.3416 bits/s/Hz, while it jumps to 1.0219 bits/s/Hz for N = 20, M = 5 with the same value of n, increasing almost 2 times. Moreover, it reaches 1.5283 bits/s/Hz for N = 30, M = 5. Although it continues to increase with N growing, the increment is getting weak, and the EST is finally limited to its channel capacity. Obviously, the spatial diversity gain improves the performance significantly, especially with high cardinality n (relative to N ). Furthermore, such a spatial diversity gain can overcome the adverse impact incurred by low SNR. One can find that the maximum EST value for N = 20 and -3 dB is even significantly greater than that for 10 dB with N = 5. On the other hand, the increment of the number of the antennas at the Eve, i.e., M , worsens the performance significantly. The maximum EST declines from 1.5283 bits/s/Hz for N = 30, M = 5 to 0.8437 bits/s/Hz for N = 30, M = 10, and further down to 0.2413 bits/s/Hz for N = 30, M = 20. Therefore, from the perspective of the Eve, it also has the spatial diversity gain.
C. PERFORMANCE IN HIGH SNR REGIME
According to the analysis in Subsection III-D, in the high SNR regime, the secrecy performance is completely deter- mined by her relative distance to Eve over BS. Fig. 4 shows the maximum EST versus relative distance in the high SNR regime. We notice the slopes of the curves increase with n decreasing, which indicates the gap between any two curves with different n becomes bigger and bigger with relative distance increasing. Such a property is the key to prove Theorem 3.
To better understand Theorem 3, we continue to demonstrate it specifically with the aids of Fig. 5 .
According to the topology in Fig. 5 , the relative distances to Eve over BS for U 1 , U 2 and U 3 are √ 58/4, √ 37/ √ 13 and √ 10/4, respectively. The maximum ESTs as well as corresponding optimal secrecy rates are listed in Table 1 for all possible SIC orders via numerical root-finding. Here, the path-loss exponent is assumed α = 3. Once again, we confirm that the optimal secrecy rate with low n is high. Moreover, the sum of maximum ESTs for all possible SIC orders are listed in Table 2 . As expected, the alternative scheme (SIC order is U 3 → U 2 → U 1 , which is also the natural order in this case) achieves the most total max-EST, while the order opposite to alternative scheme (i.e., U 1 → U 2 → U 3 ) results in the worst performance. Any order inversion can lead to a reduction of total max-EST. For instance, U 1 → U 3 → U 2 can be obtained by one-step inversion from U 3 → U 1 → U 2 , and the corresponding total max-EST is reduced to 8.6145 bits/s/Hz from 8.6304 bits/s/Hz. Otherwise, the sum of maximum ESTs for the round-robin scheme is just the average value of the total max-ESTs listed in Table 2 . It is obviously less than the alternative scheme regarding the total max-EST.
D. POWER ALLOCATION
We continue the scenario in Fig. 5 to numerically examine the optimal power allocation with the constraint of limited total power. Fig. 6 plots the derivatives of the maximum ESTs for all these three users, where the SIC order of these users is scheduled with alternative scheme. The noise power (one diversity branch) at both BS and Eve is assumed to be −10 dBm, i.e., N b = N e = −10 dBm. The pathloss exponent is still α = 3. According to the analysis in Section V, the condition of the optimal power allocation point is that each user has the same derivative of the maximum EST at its allocated power, that is, T max,1 (P 1, 2, 3 ) denotes the derivative of the maximum EST. Therefore, the optimal power allocation point can be found by adjusting the baseline in Fig. 6 to make the sum of each corresponding power meet the total power. For instance, to allocate the total power of 1 mW, i.e., P total = 1 mW, the baseline moving to the position of the blue line can achieve the optimal power allocation point for these three users, correspondingly, P * 1 = 0.5 mW, P * 2 = 0.5 mW, [P * 3 ] + = 0 mW. The power allocation point of P total = 2 mW is in the position of green line, where P * 1 = 0.96 mW, P * 2 = 0.86 mW and P * 3 = 0.18 mW. The black line is the position for the allocation point of P total = 3 mW, where P * 1 = 1.45 mW, P * 2 = 1.25 mW and P * 3 = 0.3 mW. One can get all the power allocation points for other values of total power.
Overall, the numeric results and observations in this section are consistent with the expectations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we considered the quasi-static Rayleigh fading K -user SIMO MAC-WT and evaluated the individual secrecy performance based on ZF-SIC. We derived the closed-form expressions of positive secrecy capacity probability, secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput. With the aid of the closed-form expressions and numerical results, we provided valuable insights into the impacts of the SIC order (i.e., n), SNR as well as the spatial diversity (i.e., N and M ). It also showed, in high SNR regime, the secrecy performance is only determined by the relative distance to Eve over BS, independent of its SNR and the CSI of other users. Two SIC order scheduling schemes are proposed, round-robin and alternative scheme. The latter one is optimal in achieving total max-EST in high SNR regime. Finally, we studied the problem of optimal power allocation among the users with the constraint of the limited total power, and disclosed the solution to this problem.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Given the independence of γ (n) k and η k , jointly with (7) and (8), the positive secrecy capacity probability of U k is derived as follows, 
